Abstract. The article analyses whether international criminal procedure is "adversarial", "inquisitorial" or mixed. It examines the law of the ICTY and the ICC, including the relevant case law. This law has developed from an adversarial to a truly mixed procedure by way of various amendments of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) and the drafting of the Rome Statute merging civil and common law elements in one international procedure.
at Rome in 1998 (hereinafter: "Rome or ICC Statute").
2 greatly in uenced by the law and practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The ICC-Rules, nally agreed on in the Preparatory Commission in November 2000 3 and formally adopted by the rst Assembly of State Parties in September 2002 (Art. 112 ICC Statute) serve both as a clari cation and as a complement to the procedural framework laid down in the ICC Statute (Art. 51 ICC Statute). Later there will be a third instrument, namely Regulations to be adopted by the Court itself (Art. 52 ICC Statute). Needless to say, it was dif cult to disentangle these three sets of norms in the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute. 4 Thus, the main difference between the ICTY and ICC lies in the fact that only the former has, so far, applied its Rules in practice and can, therefore, provide us with more concrete and precise guidance as to which, if any, model is to be preferred at the international level. 5 Before turning to an analysis of the ICTY and ICC rules in response to the question set out above a terminological point must be made. 6 The term "inquisitorial" as commonly applied by common lawyers to describe the continental "civil" law systems is quite unfortunate since it reminds us of the darkest times of the middle ages when the prosecution and adjudication of a case was concentrated in one institution -the actively investigating judge (inquisitio = enquiry, inquest) -, the procedure exclusively written and secret and torture a legitimate means to obtain confessions. 7 From the legal historian's perspective, the term "inquisitorial procedure" is usually reserved for the type of disciplinary as well as criminal procedure instituted by Pope Innocent III in the 13th century which then evolved both in Canon law and secular if at all, a meaning in historic, pre-revolutionary terms. 15 Nowadays, modern criminal procedure is governed by the principles of orality and immediacy. In other words, the only element which could explain the term "inquisitorial" for this kind of procedure is its truth-seeking nature: While in the adversarial system this search for the (procedural) truth lies, if at all, in the hand of the parties and therefore their con ict is at the center of the proceedings ('two cases approach'), in an "inquisitorial" system it is the responsibility of the State agencies in charge of criminal prosecution ('one case approach'). 16 In this sense, the civil law model can be more accurately described as "judge led" (instruktorisch) or -following Damaŝka's more structural approach -"hierarchical", while the common law model is adversarial -prosecution and defences being "adversaries" -or "coordinated". 17 Another misnomer is "Anglo-American" procedure if it is meant to imply that there is such a thing as a common criminal procedure of Great Britain and the U.S.A. while, in fact, the "British" (English, Scottish and Irish) procedures differ among themselves and equally with regard to the U.S. procedures which are, in turn, different in the various States. In any case, still worse than the misleading use of terminology is to attribute an incorrect or inadequate meaning. Unfortunately, this occurs too often with common lawyers who sometimes write about civil law exclusively relying on common law sources 18 and taking the French model of an examining judge as the only civil law model 19 although one should at least distinguish between this and the prosecutorial model (of German origin). 20 If one takes a closer look at the diversity of the criminal justice systems within the Europe of the European Union and -even more so -of the Council of Europe, harmonisation or convergence can by no 15 In this sense the classic study by J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, 1969, at 134 et seq.; apparently as well employed in this sense by D.M. Amann, Harmonic convergence? ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 Indiana Law Journal (2000) , 809-873, at 816-817. 16 See for a good explanation of the main features Orie, supra note 14, at 1443 et seq. 17 Damaŝka, supra note 8, at 16 et seq. 18 A recent example is May/Wierda, supra note 5, at 727 using not only the classical dichotomy "adversarial" and "inquisitorial" but also, for example, wrongly asserting that in the civil law system the scope of the evidence is not restricted invoking as a reference an article from the Am. J. Crim. L.; but see, for example, § 245 para. 2 German StPO according to which evidentiary motions can be rejected by the presiding judge for various reasons. 19 As an example see Robinson, supra note 14, at 575 who seems only to know the French system if he writes that "in the inquisitorial system there is an investigating judge". means automatically be taken for granted. 21 With all these reservations the terms "adversarial"/"inquisitorial" will here only be used in the general sense described to re ect the still existing common-civil law divide. 22 After all, it remains true that "typology becomes cumbersome and dif cult to employ as an instrument of analysis" 23 when we are talking about concrete procedural issues and speci c rules.
Returning to our question, today there is general agreement that the procedure before the ICTY and ICC is a mixed one in that it contains structural elements or building blocks of both the "adversarial" and the "inquisitorial" system. 24 It must not be overlooked, however, that it is only recent developments which have strengthened the civil law elements in international criminal procedure. Originally, the law of the Ad Hoc Tribunals was drafted by common lawyers and the Draft Statute of the International Law Commission for an ICC 25 provided for an adversarial procedure. 26 Although a Chamber of the ICTY stated in 1996 that the procedure before the ICTY developed a "unique amalgam of common and civil law features" and "does not 21 This impression, however, is created by Amann, supra note 15, at 810, 825 et seq.
speaking of "European integration at the vanguard of convergence". 22 In a similar vein apparently Orie, supra note 14, at 1440 et seq. with various references. 23 Damaŝka, supra note 8, at 5. 24 For the ICTY and ICTR see R. Dixon developed towards a mixed procedure and so currently one can fairly speak of a sui generis model. 31 As to the ICC, the beginning of the Preparatory Committee discussions in 1995 was common law dominated to such a degree that the French delegate Gilbert Bitti decided "to warn" his government "that a strong reaction was necessary in order to avoid a pure common law system". 32 and indeed have accused the French of delaying the negotiations, 33 the fact of the matter is that the so called "French Draft" presented in 1996 34 was crucial in bringing about real discussions between common and civil law which nally led to the convergence of both systems in the ICC Statute and the Rules. 35 Let us now take a closer look at the law and practice of the ICTY and ICC with regard to the procedural stages of international procedure, i.e., the investigation, pre-trial and trial phase.
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The investigation phase
In both Tribunals the Of ce of the Prosecuter, allegedly strong and independent, initiates and directs the investigation. The Prosecutor decides if there is a prima facie case 37 that requires further investigation. She may carry out mere investigative measures, i.e., measures which do not infringe on individual rights, e.g., summon and question suspects, victims and witnesses as well as "collect" any other evidence (Art. 18 (2) ICTY, Rule 39 (i); Art. 54 (3) ICC-Statute). She needs judicial authorization, however, for coercive measures, e.g., the arrest of a suspect (Rules 54 et seq.; Art. 57 (3) ICC Statute). The rst important difference between the ICTY and the ICC relates to the scope and time of the control and supervision of the prosecutor. While the prosecutor of the ICTY decides formally independent whether to le an indictment or to drop a case and is only subject to a subsequent "review" of the indictment (Art. 18 (4), 19 ICTYS, Rule 47), in the case of the ICC, the UN Security Council may suspend an investigation for a -renewable -period of 12 months (Art. 16 ICC Statute) and the Pre-trial chamber intervenes 33 Bitti, supra note 26, at 274; Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 4, at 221, according to whom the existence of the alternative French Draft "made discussions extremely dif cult". 34 where the prosecutor decides whether or not there is a "reasonable basis" to initiate proceedings, i.e., long before the indictment is drafted (Art. 15 (3), 53 ICC Statute). 38 However, little, if anything, can be concluded from this difference as far as our question is concerned: Judicial interference before an indictment can possibly be drafted runs counter to both the adversarial and inquisitorial modes of procedure, since both models leave this decision to the prosecutor alone. 39 It is plainly incorrect to consider the strong and independent ICTY and ICC prosecutor as an expression of the common law system since it was one of the great achievements of the "accusatorial" 40 reform of the ancient inquisitorial system to create a prosecution authority responsible for the investigation. It may be argued, though, that the whole idea of pretrial judicial control or supervision of the prosecutor -by way of a kind of intermediate procedure and a pre-trial chamber -is a mixture of French and German in uence and as such represents a "clear inquisitorial feature" of the pre-trial phase before the ICC. 41 Indeed, during negotiations, common law delegates of the "like-minded" (ICC friendly) countries felt that any judicial intervention during the investigation, apart from the issuing of warrants of arrest etc., could jeopardize the independence of the Prosecutor; 42 but they had to realize very soon that the alternative, proposed by countries hostile to the idea of an independent Prosecutor, was a political control by the UN-Security Council, i.e., by ve States two of which are hostile (U.S.A. and China) and one which is, at best, neutral (Russia) to the idea of an ICC. 43 end, the like-minded group as a whole felt obliged to support an independent prosecutor subject to judicial control, leaving behind the civil-common law divide. It is interesting to note in this context that the U.S. decision to notify the UN-Secretary General that the U.S. does not feel any longer bound by the signature of the Clinton administration (to "unsign" the ICC treaty) was justi ed, among other things, by the Rome Statute's "prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power". 44 We have just seen that the contrary is true and it is depressing to see the extent to which the current US administration is prepared to obscure the truth in its attempts to discredit the ICC.
Returning to the functions of the Prosecutor, her impartiality, the obligation to establish the truth and present not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory evidence -explicitly recognized by a Chamber of the ICTY 45 and in Art. 54 (1) (a), 67 (2) ICC Statute -may be seen as a typical feature of the civil law procedure. 46 Although the Prosecutor in the adversarial system is also required to adhere to the principles of truth and objectivity, 47 the civil law system is structurally different in that it does not operate in terms of a prosecution and defence case and therefore the Prosecutor is considered an independent agent rather than a party. 48 On the other hand, the Prosecutor has a wide discretion with regard to the decision to initiate an investigation which ultimately depends on "the interests of justice" (Art. 53 (1) (c), (2) (3)(d)). 50 For civil lawyers these formulations display worrying similarities to plea bargaining, 51 i.e., a classical common law feature.
The pre-trial phase
Although neither the ICTY nor the ICC procedure provide for a formal separation between investigation and pre-trial phase, a line can be drawn with the presentation of the indictment (ICTY) or the charges (ICC) by the Prosecutor. At this moment the investigation ends and the pre-trial phase starts. 52 Here again we discover important differences between the two Tribunals. While the ICTY indictment is only subject to the already mentioned review procedure by a single judge (Art. 19 ICTY Statute, Rule 47), the ICC charges must be con rmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the so called con rmation hearing (Art. 61 ICC Statute); whereas the "indictment" can be con rmed without the accused and she may even be subjected to the famous Rule 61 in absentia procedure, 53 the "charges" may, as a rule, 54 only be con rmed if the accused is present (Art. 61 (1) 2nd cl. ICC Statute). 55 Be that as it may, the con rmation hearing has received general support from all sides 56 and indeed it can be accommodated within both the adversarial and "inquisitorial" 50 Crit. Turone, supra note 37, at 1169-1170. 51 Friman, supra note 24, at 201. 52 According to Vohrah, supra note 24, at 485 the pre-trial phase only begins with the conrmation of the indictment by the judge (and ends with the presentation of the evidence by the Prosecution at trial). This would mean, however, that the period between the presentation of the indictment and the judicial con rmation would belong to the investigation phase although normally the Prosecution would only wait for the judicial decision in this period. In any case, this is only a formal question without material implications. On the pre-trial phase from a comparative perspective see Marchesiello, supra note 24, at 1231 et seq. who draws a line with the rst appearance of the accused (at 1239). 53 Although it is "it is dif cult to conclude that the rule 61 proceeding is equivalent to a trial in absentia" (Expert Group Report, supra note 29, para. 57; also Vohrah, supra note 24, at 504; McDonald, supra note 24, at 556; Terrier, supra note 24, at 1283), it still remains an in absentia procedure (similarly Orie, supra note 14, at 1467). In any case, also the Expert Group recognizes that it "could be abandoned without any signi cant diminuition in Tribunal effectiveness . . . " (ibid., para. 60). See on this procedure also Safferling, supra note 7, at 243; Vohrah, supra note 24, 503 et seq.; McDonald, supra note 24, at 555 et seq. model: one may consider it -as common lawyers usually do -as a kind of lter to ensure that only the really signi cant cases go to trial 57 or -as civil lawyers, especially the French (who "invented" it 58 ), do -as a rather lengthy pre-trial in order to "con rm" or check the charges and to avoid time consuming disputes about disclosure of evidence in the trial stage. 59 In this sense it may be compared to the French procedure in the case of "crimes" before the "Chambre d'accusation" or, as introduced by the recent reform of the Code de Procédure Pénale, the "Chambre de l'Instruction criminelle" (Art. 191-230 CPP). 60 In any case, a similar " lter" procedure was introduced in December 1998 in the Ad Hoc Tribunals with the Pre-Trial and Pre-Defence Conferences (ICTY Rules 73bis and 73ter) and existed already before by means of the Status Conferences (ICTY Rule 65bis). 61 The introduction of a Pre-Trial Judge (ICTY Rule 65ter) strengthens judicial intervention at the pre-trial stage following the civil law model although this judge has only coordinating, not investigating functions.
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Another area of con ict between common and civil law refers to the presentation of the charges by the Prosecutor. While there is abundant case law from the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the form of the indictment (Art. 18 (4) ICTY Statute, Rule 47) requiring a precise statement of the facts and their legal classi cation imputed to the accused, 63 it is less clear whether prosec- utorial charges have binding effect on the subsequent proceedings. In general, it is clear that after con rmation of the charges an amendment requires judicial authorization; on the other hand, if such authorization is granted, the actual amendment is the task of the Prosecutor. 64 In Kupreskic, a Trial Chamber allowed an amendment of the indictment only with regard to less serious offences or the rejection of offences; as to more serious or different offences, the Trial Chamber must call upon the Prosecutor to amend the Indictment. 65 As for the ICC, according to Art. 74 (2) cl. 2 of the Statute, the Court must base its judgment "on the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges"; however, it is not clear whether these charges are still the original ones as drafted by the Prosecutor or whether the Pre-Trial Chamber has the right to amend them proprio motu in the conrmation hearing. The former approach would be the one preferred by the common law, since in its tradition the Court is bound by the Prosecutor's legal classi cation of the charges. The latter approach is more similar to the civil law where the Court can not only accept or dismiss but also -according to the principle iura novit curia -amend, in its own right, the charges. 66 At rst sight, the ICC Statute seems to follow the common law approach since para. 16: As to responsibility on the basis of the common purpose as part of a joint criminal enterprise the indictment must indicate "the nature or purpose of the joint criminal enterprise" (its "essence"), the time over which the enterprise existed, the identity of those engaged in the enterprise at least by reference to their category as a group; the nature of the participation of the accused in the enterprise. the Chamber may only con rm or reject the charges (Art. 61 (7) (a), (b)) or adjourn the hearing and "request the Prosecutor to consider" (Art. 61 (7) (c)) either to provide further evidence (i) or amend a charge because of a different legal quali cation (ii). On the other hand, given the broad powers of the PreTrial and the Trial Chamber, it may be argued that it has the inherent power to amend the charges as long as the rights of the defence are not violated, i.e., as long as the defence has enough time to react to such an amendment. 67 In fact, the lack of clarity of the ICC Statute in this matter is due to the lack of agreement of common and civil lawyers during the negotiations. The question was, as many, conspicuously left open. 68 Further problems arise in relation to the disclosure rules. 69 In both Tribunals the Prosecutor is obliged to disclose most (incriminating) evidence to the defence, either proprio motu or on request (ICTY Rules 66; Art. 61 (3) ICC Statute, Rules 76, 77, 121 (2)). 70 As to the exculpatory evidence, it must be disclosed "as soon as practicable" (ICTY Rule 68; Art. 67 (2) ICC Statute, Rule 83). 71 A representative of the Prosecution must certify that a full search of all relevant material has been conducted. 72 defence "envisages more than a blind confrontation in the courtroom". 73 Such a blind confrontation may, however, result from the need to protect certain witnesses and grant them anonymity (Art. 22 ICTY Statute, Rules 69, 75; Art. 68 ICC Statute, Rules 87, 88). 74 Although this possibility affects, in principle, both prosecution and defence witnesses, it will more often restrain the accused's right of confrontation and therefore a dif cult balance between this right and the protection of witnesses must be struck. 75 The defence has only speci c disclosure obligations with regard to special defences, for example, an alibi (ICTY Rule 67, ICC Rules 78, 79). 76 It cannot be obliged to disclose inculpatory evidence since this would violate the accused's privilege against self-incrimination (Art. 67 (1) (g) ICC Statute) 77 and as such, the general principle of equality of arms given the prosecution's superior resources. Thus, disclosure is an ongoing process 84 entailing a "continuing obligation" that extends to the post-trial stage, including appeals.
85 From a conceptual perspective, such disclosure rules are a clear expression of the adversarial model since its "two cases approach" makes (mutual) disclosure necessary to ensure that both parties have the same level of information. 86 In contrast, such rules are super uous in the civil law system where, according to the "one case approach", 87 the investigation lies in the hands of the Prosecutor and she investigates both incriminating and exonerating evidence. It is suf cient in these circumstances to grant the defence access to the Prosecutor's dossier at some point before the beginning of the trial. 88 In a way, the dossier ful ls the function of the common law disclosure rules. 89 In fact, ICC Rule 121 (2) (c) links the disclosure rules to the dossier requiring that all disclosed evidence shall be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 90 Certainly, the conceptual difference between disclosure and dossier may be less valid in practice where we can detect a clear convergence of the systems in that the Prosecution in- vestigates basically its own case and tries to keep the evidence secret as long as possible. Even an active civil law judge may hardly be able to compensate for the Prosecution's advantages arising from the investigation phase. From a human rights perspective, therefore, only broad disclosure rules adequately safeguard the right of the defence. This applies not only to an adversarial procedure. In this sense, the "all cards on the table" approach adopted by the ICC Rules (esp. Rules 77, 78) is to be welcomed.
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As to potential national security interests one can formulate a threefold rule: ordinary information should be disclosed to the accused herself, condential information only to her counsel and certain national security information need not be disclosed at all.
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Much more indicative of the compromise character of the current ICTY and ICC rules is the development of the guilty plea or -as it is called in the ICC Statute (Art. 65) -the "admission of guilt" procedure. 93 Originally, ICTY Rules 62 (iii)-(v) provided for a straightforward common law guilty plea procedure which brought the trial directly to the sentencing stage if the accused entered a plea. 94 In this case, a separate sentencing hearing was conducted, i.e., the procedure to establish guilt or innocence of the accused and the decision on the sentence were separated. 95 This system broke down very quickly with the Erdemovic trial where the inadequately defended accused "confessed" to having killed civilians under duress. 96 valid guilty plea which can now be found in Rule 62bis: the plea must be made voluntarily, it must be informed, not be equivocal and there must be a suf cient factual basis for the crime and the accused's participation in it. Only if these conditions are ful lled may the Trial Chamber enter a nding of guilt and set a date for the sentencing hearing (Rules 62bis, 100). Rule 62ter further provides for a plea agreement 99 procedure between prosecutor and accused whose most important feature in our context is that it is not binding upon the Trial Chamber. Indeed, the Chamber is not con ned to a consideration of the facts as agreed between Prosecution and Defence "because its fundamental obligation is to ensure that there is a suf cient factual basis for the crime and the accused's participation in it". 100 Only if the Chamber enters a nding of guilt should it, as a rule, rely on the agreed facts for sentencing. 101 Similarly, Art. 65 ICC Statute and Rule 139, greatly in uenced by the Erdemovic disaster, 102 leave it completely to the Trial Chamber to decide on the validity of the "admission of guilt", taking into account the above mentioned criteria. It may either enter a conviction or order the continuation of the trial. In addition, any agreement or deal between prosecutor and accused -the ICC Statute refers to "discussions" -is not binding upon the Trial Chamber (ICTY Rule 62ter (C), Art. 65 (5) ICC Statute). Thus, although the need for discussions between the parties was recognized, this was not to prevent victims and witness from speaking about the "historical truth" in open court. 103 The provision can hardly be called a "compromise", 104 it rather shows how strong the in uence of the civil law, in this case its scepticism towards the whole idea of bargaining mechanisms in criminal trials, has become. In fact, it can be said that the "overregulation" of the guilty plea undermines its very purpose, namely to shorten proceedings; 105 its effect is converted into that of a mere confession.
This type of guilty plea can lead to great frustration among common lawyers. The present author witnessed a trial in East Timor under UNTAET regulation 15/2000 -which is essentially a copy of the ICC Statute -where an accused entered a guilty plea on the basis of a plea agreement with the (British) prosecutor -following the practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 107 He obviously desired the termination of his trial, but was so intensely questioned by a three judge panel of civil lawyers (two internationals from Italy and Benin and one from East Timor) that he nally gave up trying to convince the judges, especially the African one, that he indeed made the plea in a voluntary, informed and unequivocal way. The end of the story was that the plea was not accepted and the trial continued in the ordinary manner for quite a long time.
In sum, the current guilty plea provisions are a good example of excessive civil law reform of established common law institutions. This makes it easy for civil lawyers -see the East Timor example -to reject even "clean" guilty pleas while common lawyers are confronted with inoperable rules completely alien to their normal practice.
The trial phase
Presentation of the case
It has rightly been asserted that the trial is the procedural stage in which common and civil law principles most strongly con ict with each other.
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Here again we can identify civil law reforms within a common law framework in various elds, rst of all with regard to the presentation of the case (ICTY Rules 82 et seq.). At rst sight, the ICTY Rules appear to resemble an adversarial procedure ("adversarial inclination"): 109 Opening statements by Prosecution and Defence (rule 84), presentation of prosecution and defence evidence followed by rebuttal and rejoinder (rule 85 (A)), "examination-inchief", "cross-examination" and "re-examination" of witnesses (Rule 85 (B)). A closer look, however, reveals that the Trial Chamber may change the course of events "in the interests of justice" (rule 85 (A)) 110 and order additional evidence proprio motu (rules 85 (A) (v) in relation to 98). Further, Rule 84bis allows the accused to make an opening statement after the statements of the parties "under the control of the Trial Chamber". Thus, at least conceptually, 107 See supra note 99. 108 Safferling, supra note 7, at 371. 109 the accused is converted from a mere object of the trial, as known from the adversarial procedure, into an active party, familiar from civil law procedure.
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On the other hand, she may also appear as a witness in her own defence (rule 85 (C)) 112 and thus obtain the status which she would enjoy in the common law. 113 The difference between these Rules lies in the fact that the opening statement does not possess the same probative value as the interrogation of the accused as a witness, since only then is the statement taken under oath and tested by cross-examination. In any case, civil law elements have "crept in" over time 114 and in 1998 a Chamber of the ICTY even held that once the witness had made the solemn declaration, i.e., taken the oath, she becomes a "witness of truth" and ceases to be "a witness for either party". 115 This clearly implies that a pure adversarial trial no longer exists. In Blaskic, the Trial Chamber repeatedly summoned witnesses under Rule 98 and speci ed that they would rst testify freely and only afterwards be interrogated by the parties. 116 As to the fair trial principle, it is worth mentioning that it has been held that a further cross-examination of a witness by one party would violate the equality of arms principle embedded in Rule 85 (A). 117 In the ICC proceedings, the role of the Trial Chamber is even more dominant. The Chamber is "responsible" for the conduct of the proceedings (Art. 64 (6) (a) in relation to Art. 61 (11) ICC Statute), may require the production of evidence (Art. 64 (6) (b), (d)) and "rule on any other relevant matters" (Art.
64 (6) (f)). The presiding judge directs the proceedings (Art. 64 (8)); only if she declines to do so can the Prosecutor and Defence "agree on the order and manner in which the evidence shall be submitted" (ICC Rule 140 (1)). This dominant role for the Chamber and the Presiding Judge has given rise to bitter disputes between common and civil lawyers not only in Rome but also later in New York in the Preparatory Commission when the Rules were negotiated. Observers spoke of a "clash of cultures between the civil law and the common Law", 118 the former in favour of a strong judge directing the trial, the latter in favour of a neutral judge leaving the conduct of the trial basically to the parties and in particular allowing them to cross-examine witnesses freely. 119 The nal compromise can be found in Rule 140 (2) according to which a witness may be questioned by Prosecution and Defence without the intervention of the Chamber which may question the witness only before or after the parties. Thus, the possibility of a cross-examination has been recognized implicitly and it will nally depend on the protagonists of the procedure whether and how this possibility will be used.
120 Interestingly enough, terms like cross-examination and other typical terms of art ("catch words") for either common or civil law are conspicuously absent from the Statute and the Rules. The Drafters wanted to make clear that what is sought is really a mixed procedure.
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Rules of evidence General
Still more power is given to the Chambers of both ICTY and ICC by the rules of evidence. In general, it is up to the Chamber to decide on the "admissibility", "relevance" and "probative value" of the evidence (ICTY Rule 89 (C); Art. 64 (9), 69 (4) ICC Statute, Rule 63 (2)). 122 The Trial Chamber has "broad discretion" -to use the words of the Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski 123 -tak- ing into account "a fair determination of the matter before it", "the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law" (ICTY Rule 89 (B)) and "the need to ensure a fair trial" (ICTY Rule 89 (D)). 124 However, evidence obtained by violation of human rights is, a limine, excluded (ex ICTY Rule 95; Art. 69 (7) ICC Statute). 125 The Chamber may also request the submission of additional evidence that it considers necessary for the "ascertainment" or "determination of the truth" (ICTY Rule 90 (G) (i), Art. 69 (3) ICC Statute).
126 Although this indicates civil law in uence, it is a widespread misconception among civil lawyers that the adversarial procedure does not pursue the truth. In fact, the search for truth is a common feature of both systems, 127 and only the method of arriving at the truth is different. One may argue that common law follows a more liberal concept of the truth -a kind of procedural rather than material truth. 128 In any case, the search for the truth is not incompatible with a common law system as long as it consists only of a right cross examination (see also ICC Rules 67 (1), 68), this possibility is explicitly mentioned in ICTY Rule 90 (H). Cross examination shall be limited, however, "to the subject matter of the evidence-in-chief and matters affecting the credibility of the witness and . . . to the subject-matter of the case". Thus, the ICTY follows the Tokyo precedent and the US Federal Rules.
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In addition, the Trial Chamber may "take judicial notice of adjudicated facts and documentary evidence from other proceedings of the Tribunal in relation to matters at issue in current proceedings" (Rule 94 (B) ). 131 In other words, such facts need not be proven twice. While this may be tolerated in light of the similarity of proceedings arising from a speci c political or military context -the same applies to evidence with regard to a consistent pattern of conduct (rule 93) -, it is highly problematic that the rules put oral and written witness evidence on an equal footing. We shall return to this point later. Finally, there are speci c rules with regard to evidence in cases of sexual violence (Rule 96); in particular, a corroboration of the victim's testimony is not required (96 (i), see also ICC Rules 70-72).
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In general, these provisions tend towards a exible civil law approach -in the sense of a " exibility Principle"
133 -with a wide discretion of the Court instead of the rather strict common law approach of a system of exclusionary rules. 134 In particular ICTY Rule 89 (B) has been interpreted as inviting "common sense" and "reasonable" approaches, 135 permitting the "golden opportunity to craft a workable and just procedural and evidentiary regime that will foster the interests of international justice". 
Admissibility of different forms of evidence
One important consequence of the " exibility principle" is that hearsay evidence, i.e., "evidence by any witness of what another person stated (whether verbally, in writing or otherwise)", 137 is, in general, admitted. 138 This has been the settled practice of the Trial Chambers of the ICTY since the hearsay decision in Tadic 139 and was con rmed by the Appeals Chamber in 1999. 140 It appears particularly important in the light of the fact that in the common law hearsay evidence is allowed only exceptionally. 141 It must not be overlooked, however, that the admission of hearsay -and other forms of evidence -is not unlimited but depends on the relevance and "probative value" of this evidence (ICTY Rule 89 (C)). 142 The probative value, in turn, depends on the reliability of the evidence which, above all, is determined by cross-examination. In the case of hearsay, the probative value or weight is, in general, lower than that of direct evidence. 143 Last but not least, evidence of any kind, as suggested before, must be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial" (ICTY Rule 89 (D)) or if it is obtained by methods which cast "substantial doubt on its reliability" (ICTY Rule 95, Art. 69 (7) (a) ICC Statute). As to the integrity of the proceedings as a whole, ICTY Rule 95 must be read together with Rule 42 concerning the rights of the suspect during investigation. It has been characterised by a Chamber as a "residual exclusionary provision" 144 and complements the general exclusionary rule 89 (D) requiring a speci c "source reliability". 145 Since the probative value and its effect of fair trial in the sense of Rule 89 (D) can often only be assessed after the examination of the evidence, it is also possible to rst admit certain evidence and later exclude it.
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In the Tadic hearsay decision, a Trial Chamber recognized that reliability is "a component of admissibility" and developed certain "indicia of reliability". 147 In Kordic and Cerkez, a Trial Chamber rejected the admission of witness statements into Prosecution testimony since this "would amount to the wholesale admission of hearsay untested by cross-examination . . . and would be of no probative value".
148 Phrased in positive terms, crossexamination is the most ef cient remedy against unreliably evidence.
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Similarly, the Appeals Chamber excluded the statement of a deceased witness because of its unreliability: "A piece of evidence may be so lacking in terms of the indicia of reliability that it is not 'probative' and is therefore inadmissible". 150 The Chamber based the unreliability test, inter alia, on the lack of cross examination of the witness and the poor quality of the hearsay, not being " rst hand", but only "more removed" hearsay 151 and, in addition, diluted by various translations. 152 Although the Chamber did not want to be understood its decision as "upsetting" the general principle of admission of hearsay evidence, 153 it considerably limits the use of hearsay evidence and the decision was even interpreted as invoking the classical common law exceptions to the hearsay rule. 154 Finally, the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber called for "extreme caution when assessing a witness identi cation of the accused made under dif cult circumstances". 155 As to documentary evidence, a Trial Chamber decided on the admissibility of certain documents on the basis of their probative value and reliability. 156 While, for example, military reports and a war diary carry their "own authenticity" and "speak for themselves" and therefore are ordinarily admissible, 157 documents, such as intelligence reports, based "on anonymous sources or hearsay statements . . . incapable of now being tested by cross-examination", cannot be admitted since their probative value was so reduced to the point where it was "substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial" in the sense of Rule 89 (D). 158 To be sure, the Chamber concluded that the possibility of crossexamination by the defence, i.e., in this case to cross-examine any witness on the documents, was a fundamental requirement to ensure a fair trial. 159 This does not mean, however, that documents may only be introduced through a witness for the purpose of their authentication -as common law would require 160 but it does con rm the general human right of the accused to "examine or have examined the witnesses against him", as recognized in Art. 14 (3) (e) CCPR, Art. 6 (3) (d) ECHR and adopted by Art. 21 (4) (e) ICTY Statute. 161 152 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, supra note 123, para. 27: ". . . multiple translations in an informal setting create a much greater potential for inaccuracy than is the case when both the declarant and the witness speak the same language or when the original statement is given in court with professional, double checked simultaneous translation". 153 Ibid., para 23 with fn 21. 154 Guariglia, supra note 138, at 670. See also Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Admiss-Fair trial standards also govern the ICTY's position with regard to the admission of transcripts and 'af davits'. 162 While Rule 94ter, relating to the latter issue, 163 was deleted in the course of the December 2000 amendment of the Rules (see below), the question of the admission of transcripts from other proceedings remains relevant. Also, the use of deposition evidence according to Rule 71 can have a similar effect in replacing the immediate hearing of witness testimony at trial. 164 The Appeals Chamber admitted the transcript of a testimony of Admiral Domazet in the Blaskic case as "hearsay" in the subsequent Aleksovski proceedings, since the possibility of cross-examination of the witness already existed in the Blaskic proceedings and there was no "particular line of cross-examination which would have been both relevant and signi cant to the Aleksovski trial but which would not also have been both relevant and signi cant to the Blaskic Trial". 165 This practice has been followed by the Kordic Trial Chamber which admitted a number of transcripts of witness testimonies from the Blaskic proceedings since the witnesses were cross-examined by the Blaskic Defence which had a "common interest" with the Defence in Kordic. 166 On the other hand, in Delalic et al. it was decided that an Austrian police interview of one of the accused could not be admitted into evidence since the Austrian procedural rules of the time stood in "direct contradiction" to Art. 18 of the ICTY Statute and Rule 42 as regards the right to counsel. 167 By way of Rule 5 this interview must be considered null in proceedings before the ICTY. 168 This decision ultimately re ects the strong fair trial stand of the ICTY and can be directly linked to Rule 95 mentioned above. 169 
The increasing importance of written evidence
While all the decisions quoted so far had as a starting point the principle of live testimony as laid down in the former Rule 90 (A), 170 with the 19th amendment to the Rules in December 2000. As a consequence, the rule on testimony by video-link has been relaxed 171 and -more importantly -Rule 89 (F) introduced, which allows the Trial Chamber to "receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow, in written form". This rule is complemented by Rule 92bis (A) according to which a "written statement" can be admitted "in lieu of oral testimony" if it "goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused . . . ". 172 The Rule goes on to provide a non-conclusive list of factors favouring the admission of written evidence and establishes a systematic set of rules on the admission of written evidence which basically rely on the previously quoted case law of the ICTY (see, for example, Rule 92bis (D) with regard to transcripts). Nevertheless, these amendments have been severely criticized, especially by common lawyers. Thus the former U.S. ICTY Judge Patricia M. Wald quali ed them as a "180 degree turn from earlier emphasis on the 'principle' of live testimony". 173 She further considered that even before these amendments "the ICTY Rules represented a departure from common law rules of evidence". 174 What occurred in December 2000 she describes as "the emerging dominance of written testimony".
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Although it cannot be denied that the deletion of the principle of live testimony (Rule 90 (A)) and the admission of written testimony in the interests of justice (Rule 89 (F)) implies a signi cant normative change, the situation is much less dramatic than painted by our common law colleagues. It is true, for example, that the border line between evidence with regard to general matters and the acts and conduct of the accused may be blurred in speci c cases, 176 especially with regard to the responsibility of the superior. 177 However, it also 19: "It cannot be stressed too strongly that the general rule is that a witness must physically be present at the seat of the International Tribunal . . . "; reprinted in Klip/Sluiter (eds.), supra note 27, at 217 (221) clearly follows from the wording of Rule 92bis (A) that a written statement cannot be admitted to prove the individual responsibility of the accused with regard to the speci c charges in the indictment ("proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused . . . "). In short, live testimony remains indispensable to prove the individual guilt of the accused. 178 This view has been con rmed in a recent decision of a Trial Chamber in Naletilic & Martinovic. 179 The Chamber further held that the chapeau requirement of Rule 92bis (A) must be extended, by means of teleological interpretation, to Rule 92bis (C) which allows, as recognized in comparative law, 180 for written testimony in the case of death or other inability of the witness to attend the trial. 181 As a consequence, written testimony under these circumstances can only be admitted if it does not refer to the acts and conduct of the accused. This applies generally to all forms of written testimony under Rule 92bis; in fact, para. (D) of this Rule contains the same formula. In addition, the ICTY case law, based on Art. 21 (4) (e) of the Statute and Rule 89 (B)-(D), has developed, as we have seen above, strict standards to ensure a fair trial for the accused, especially by testing the reliability of the evidence. 182 These standards also restrict the use of written testimony. They are not supplanted or modi ed by Rule 92bis. 183 In the Milosevic proceedings, the admission of the written statements of 23 prosecution witnesses was limited in number and those witnesses admitted were required to attend for cross examination; if a witness fails to appear, her written statement will not be admitted. 184 Although the Chamber was of the view that the statements fall within the chapeau of Rule 92bis (A), i.e., they go to proof of matters other than the acts of the accused, 185 they "relate to a critical element of the Prosecution's case" 186 and, therefore, "the requirements of fair trial demand the accused be given the right" to cross-examination. 187 In any case, if written evidence is admitted at all it will not possess the "same per se probative value" as live testimony. 188 If there is a contradiction between the written and oral statements of a witness, the parties may ask the witness "to explain the discrepancy, inconsistency or contradictions" to the Tribunal which will later determine the probative value of the alleged contradiction.
189 On a more general policy level it must be recalled that the December 2000 amendments were a reaction to the criticism of the length of the proceedings at the Tribunal. 190 This length -from 10 to 224 days (in the Milosevic case the Prosecution's estimate for a joint trial of all three indictments was about 3 years 191 ) -is largely due to the high number of live witnesses -between 100 and 200 (in Milosevic an estimated 380-600) -the testimony of one witness on average taking one trial day. 192 The reliance on witness testimony distinguishes the current trials from those of Nuremberg and Tokyo where the Prosecution case was largely built on documentary evidence. 193 Although this may change in trials against military and political leaders who did not personally ("with their own hands") perform any acts of violence, but acted behind the scenes and may therefore only be convicted through documentary and circumstantial evidence, 194 witness testimony will remain crucial for the simple reason that modern dictators do not necessarily keep a detailed record of their atrocities for subsequent prosecutions. Thus, the Expert Group's Report of 1999 recommended the use of other forms of evidence, in particular 186 Ibid., para. 24. 187 written "prepared testimony". 195 Such exibility is also justi ed in the light of the nature of the crimes to be prosecuted before International Criminal Tribunals. These are not ordinary national crimes but international ones which take place in a certain historical and political context. 196 This context must rst be understood and investigated to adequately impute individual responsibility to the various suspects involved in the criminal enterprise. To prove this context, different and more exible methods must be allowed, as, for example, is expressed in ICTY Rule 93 with regard to evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct and in Rule 94 with regard to judicial notice. 197 Finally, fears of common lawyers vis à vis the "inquisitorial" tendency of a judge-led procedure may be countered with the argument that these fears are much more justi ed in a trial before lay participants such as the jury. At the international level, it is expected to have a bench of professional judges with suf cient experience to weigh the evidence, taking into account the necessary considerations of justice and in particular the rights of the accused.
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The Expert Group Report further stated that the Judges "expressed the belief that the prolonged nature of Tribunal proceedings was attributable . . . to not enough control . . . over the proceedings by the judges". 199 In other words, the length of the proceedings is taken as an argument for a more "inquisitorial" procedure which relies more on judicial direction than the free interplay of the parties. However, demands for a faster trial must have a hollow ring in the ears of common lawyers when at the same time the common law's classical method to achieve this result, the guilty plea, has been restricted to such a degree that it cannot longer exercise this function as it does in an adversarial trial. Be that as it may, the debate about the length of the international proceedings is not only about ef ciency but also about human rights since the right to a speedy trial is recognized in all major human rights instruments; 200 indeed, a speedy trial is in the interest of the accused as long as it does not restrict her right to an adequate defence. 195 Report Expert Group, supra note 29, para. 85 et seq., 88 with recommendation 12: "written testimony submitted in advance in question-and-answer form, with an opportunity given to the other party later to object to questions, and the witness being later made available for cross-examination"; "preparation of a dossier . . . containing witness statements . . . to enable the Trial Chamber to select relevant witnesses for oral testimony and to admit certain witness statements as documentary evidence . . . ". 196 Turning to the ICC, the principle is that of live testimony "in person". 201 The Court may, however, permit oral or recorded testimony by video or audio technology and the introduction of documents or written transcripts (Art. 69 (2), Rules 67, 68). The parties may -in an adversarial manner! -agree on certain facts but -civil law in uence! -such an agreement is not binding on the Chamber; it may nonetheless consider the fact not proven and hear more evidence on it (Rule 69). 202 There are also speci c rules with regard to evidence in cases of sexual violence (Rules 70-72) . 203 The use of audio or video technology, widely practised by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, implies the admission of previously recorded evidence and thus entails a deviation from the principle of immediacy; therefore, the ICTY has developed strict criteria to use such technology: the testimony must be suf ciently important, the witness must be unwilling or unable to attend and the right of confrontation of the accused must be preserved. 204 The use of written transcripts is certainly more dangerous since it does not only affect the principle of immediacy but also the principle of orality. For this reason, it is to be welcomed that the ICC chooses a more restrictive approach than the ICTY requiring that the parties have the possibility to examine the witness at one point of the proceedings (Rule 68). 205 This approach takes into account Art. 6 (3) (d) ECHR and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court according to which an effective right of defence requires that the accused had, at least at one point during the proceedings, the possibility to question the witness. 206 whether the Trial Chamber shall or may inspect the record -Rule 131 only refers to the Prosecutor, Defence, State representatives and victims -, 208 the mere existence of the record (although it may not be as complete as a French "dossier") 209 entails -from a common law perspective -the risk that the Trial Chamber will rely on this "record" instead of deciding on the basis of the evidence it receives in the actual trial. 210 The right interpretation obviously also depends on the function and role of the presiding judge during trial: if she really wants to direct the trial, as Art. 64 (8) ICC-Statute allows her to do, she may need the knowledge from the record to do so effectively; 211 if she leaves the conduct of the trial -in an adversarial manner -to the parties she does not need this knowledge. Ultimately, as shown by the practice of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals, 212 the judges may well choose the option they know best from their national systems. 213 The limit is clearly laid down in Art. 74 (2) ICC Statute according to which the judgement must be based "only on evidence submitted and discussed . . . at the trial", i.e., the record may only play a supportive function at most. Such a function may, however, always be necessary given the factual and legal complexities involved in war crimes trials. 214 In sum, it is fair to say that the rules of evidence adopt, despite the broad powers of the Trial Chamber, a mixed approach combining civil and common law features. The practical application of these rules will ultimately depend on the legal background of the judges who are given suf cient discretion to conduct trials in accordance with their own preferences. 215 
Other aspects
In both Tribunals the judgement must be accompanied by a reasoned opinion (Art. 23 (2) ICTY Statute, Rule 98ter (C); Art. 74 (5) ICC Statute), unknown in common law jury trials. 216 As to the appeals procedure, 217 both ICTY and ICC allow for an appeal of the Prosecutor against acquittal (Art. 25 (1) ICTY Statute; Art. 81 (1) (a) ICC Statute). In common law systems such an automatic right of appeal against an acquittal does not exist 218 since, for most common lawyers, it is a deeply troubling, if not utterly uncivilized concept to subject an accused to a criminal trial for a second time arising from the same act; it constitutes a violation of the rule against double jeopardy (ne 219 bis in idem). 220 While the generous scope of the right to appeal resembles the civil law, the appeals procedure is based on the common law since it does not allow a trial de novo but only a review of the decision on clearly identi ed points of fact and law with limited opportunities for new evidence. 221 The two act or stages approach of the adversarial system with regard to adjudication ( nding of guilt) and the sentence 222 was originally provided for in the ICTY but latter the two acts were merged -again for reasons of 216 This is overlooked by Robinson, supra note 14, at 575 if he considers a reasoned written opinion as a feature of both systems. 217 For a detailed analysis of the ICC regime, see Brady, The Rules of Procedure and their application before the International Criminal Tribunals. 230 Thus, it is not important whether a rule is either adversarial or "inquisitorial" but whether it assists "the Tribunals in accomplishing their tasks . . . " 231 and whether it complies with fundamental fair trial standards. 232 Given the widespread criticism in this respect, 233 it is necessary to recall that the ECHR has recognized that the procedure before the ICTY offers all necessary due process guarantees, including the impartiality and independence of the Tribunal. 234 Although it is true that "substantial problems of coherence and legal security" exist in international criminal procedure "because each system [common and civil law] represents a carefully structured balance between the rights of the parties to the trial", 235 it is no solution to these problems to establish common and civil law chambers as recently proposed by some common law colleagues. 236 This would deepen the differences between the two systems instead of using the chance to develop a truly mixed international criminal procedure which deserves to be called sui generis. 237 In assessing whether one system is better suited than the other to be applied in international criminal proceedings, one should, following an issueoriented approach, 238 distinguish between the pre-trial and trial phase of the proceedings. As to the former, the civil law approach seems to be advantageous with regard to the equality of arms between Prosecution and Defence. The experience of the Ad Hoc Tribunals shows that the Defence -apart from the fact that it enters the case at a very late (pre-trial) stage -never of the civil law tradition. 245 Indeed, it cannot be denied that a trial directed and managed by an experienced judge can avoid delays produced by the free and uncontrolled interplay of the parties. The same applies to the pre-trial phase coordinated by a Pre-Trial judge (ICTY Rule 65ter). 246 On the other hand, agreements between Prosecution and Defence, reached under the supervision of a Judge should not be rejected a limine by civil lawyers since they are an important element to shorten proceedings. 247 It must not be forgotten, however, that procedural rules only provide for a general framework, the smooth functioning of which depends, ultimately, on the procedural protagonists, especially the judges. 248 A truly mixed, sui generis procedure requires Prosecutors, Defence Counsel and Judges who have knowledge of both common and civil law and are able to look beyond their own legal systems. 249 Although the existing procedural rules leave enough room for both common and civil lawyers to conduct proceedings in accordance with their national law, the practice of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, especially of the ICTY, shows that national boundaries in criminal procedure may be overcome with increasing experience and practice within the framework of a system of international criminal justice which is heading towards a harmonic convergence of both systems. In the future, a much greater problem may be to accommodate legal systems not based on western traditions as, for example, the Islamic law.
